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ABSTRACT
Despite a $140 billion existing tax break for employer-provided health insurance, tax policy remains
the tool of choice for many policy-makers in addressing the problem of the uninsured.  In this paper,
I use a microsimulation model to estimate the impact of various tax interventions to cover the
uninsured, relative to an expansion of public insurance designed to accomplish the same goals.  I
contrast the efficiency of these policies along several dimensions, most notably the dollars of public
spending per dollar of insurance value provided.  I find that every tax policy is much less efficient
than public insurance expansions: while public insurance costs the government only between $1.17
and $1.33 per dollar of insurance value provided, tax policies cost the government between $2.36
and $12.98 per dollar of insurance value provided.  I also find that targeting is crucial for efficient
tax policy; policies tightly targeted to the lowest income earners have a much higher efficiency than
those available higher in the income distribution.  Within tax policies, tax credits aimed at employers
are the most efficient, and tax credits aimed at employees are the least efficient, because the single
greatest determinant of insurance coverage is being offered insurance by your employer, and because
most employees who are offered already take up that insurance.  Tax credits targeted at non-group











Federal, state, and local governments in the United States intervene in health insurance 
markets in a number of ways.  Most prominent are the major public insurance programs for the 
elderly and disabled, Medicare, and for low income groups, Medicaid.  In $2003, the Medicare 
program spent $260 billion, while Medicaid spent $160 billion. Close behind is a much less well 
known federal program that spends over $140 billion/year subsidizing the private purchase of 
health insurance.  This program is larger than Unemployment Insurance, Workers’ 
Compensation, the TANF cash welfare program and EITC wage subsidies combined.  Yet it is 
little known and even less well understood by the general public and many politicians.   
This program is the tax exclusion of employer-provided health insurance expenditures.  
When employers pay their employees in cash, that compensation is taxed by federal, state and 
sometimes local income taxes, as well as by federal and state payroll taxes.  Yet when employers 
pay those same employees in health insurance, that compensation is completely untaxed.  For a 
worker in the District of Columbia who faces an income tax rate of 25%, a Social Security and 
Medicare payroll tax rate (combined employer and employee shares) of 15.3%, and a DC income 
tax rate of 9.5%, this amounts to almost a 50% subsidy to employer provided health insurance 
relative to cash compensation.  In total, estimates suggest that these subsidies add to over $140 
billion in the U.S. in 2004. 
Despite the large amount that governments in the U.S. spend on health care, however, 
major access problems remain.  Forty-five million Americans lack health insurance, resulting in 
limited access to many basic health services and reduced health.  For many politicians, the 
answer to the access problem is a simple one: further expansion in the tax subsidization of health  
insurance. 
In this paper, I broadly analyze the possibilities for tax policy as a means of addressing 
our health care problems.  I begin by discussing the role of the existing tax exclusion.  I then 
discuss a host of additional tax policies that might be used to increase health insurance coverage 
in the U.S., ranging from tax subsidies to the purchase of health insurance plans by individuals to 
targeted tax subsidies for employers.  
To formalize these discussions, I rely on an extensive microsimulation model that has 
been developed to analyze the implications of a wide variety of health insurance reform options.  
This model incorporates the best available evidence from the health economics literature to 
model how individuals, families and firms respond to changes in the insurance environment.  By 
incorporating these responses, I am able to compute dynamic estimates of the impact of health 
insurance reforms on the distribution of health insurance coverage, government costs, and private 
health care burdens. 
The paper proceeds as follows.  I begin, in Part I, with a detailed description of existing 
and proposed tax policies towards health insurance, and a brief review of the relevant literature 
on their impacts.  In Part II, I briefly describe the microsimulation model that forms the basis for 
my analysis.  For comparison to later tax policy analyses, in this section I discuss the analysis of 
a prototypical expansion in public health insurance.  Part III evaluates a host of alternatives for 
increasing insurance coverage.  Part IV concludes. 
 
  Part I: Background 




As noted in the introduction, the third largest health care “program” in the United States 
is the exclusion of employer-provided health insurance expenditures from taxation.  The subsidy 
to employer-provided health insurance is generally not well understood.  This is not a subsidy to 
employers, but rather a subsidy to employees for insurance purchased in the employment setting. 
  From the employer’s perspective, whether she pays a worker in wages or health insurance is 
irrelevant; either way, a dollar of employer spending has the same effect on the firm’s bottom 
line (and thus on corporate tax payments).  From the worker’s perspective, however, there is a 
large difference: by being paid in health insurance, rather than wages, the worker is saving taxes. 
 So, if the government wanted to end the tax subsidy, it would not involve corporate taxation; 
rather, the subsidy would be ended by including employer spending on health insurance as part of 
taxable compensation to the individual employee.   
This subsidy has been extended not only to employer spending, but to employee 
contributions to health insurance plans as well.  In firms which have established a “Section 125" 
plan, employee contributions for health insurance can be made on a tax free basis.  The cost of 
this subsidy is included in the $144 billion estimate noted above. 
For many years, the exclusion of employer-provided insurance from taxation was seen as 
discriminatory towards the self-employed.  Beginning in 1986, the health insurance premiums of 
the self-employed were made partially tax-deductible, and these premiums are now full tax 






Proposed Tax Policies Towards Health Insurance 
Despite the existence of these large subsidies to employer-provided insurance, there have 
been many proposals in recent years to use the tax code to provide additional subsidies to private 
insurance in order to reduce the ranks of the uninsured.  Most prominent among these are 
proposals to provide individuals with tax credits to purchase non-group insurance on their own 
(not through employers).  A typical example of such a non-group credit is that proposed by 
President Bush in his 2004 Budget.  This key features of his plan are: 
·  It is fully available to all singles up to $15,000 of (modified) AGI, and phases out for 
singles by $30,000 of AGI 
·  It is fully available to all families up to $30,000 of AGI, and phases out for families by 
$60,000 of AGI 
·  The credit amount is $1000 for each adult and $500 for each child, up to a maximum of 
$3000 per family. 
·  Families can use this credit against up to 90% of their non-group insurance costs 
·  The credit can be used only for non-group (specifically non-employer-provided)  
insurance 
An alternative, or supplement, for non-group credits are credits for employees to take up 
the insurance which they are offered, or an employee tax credit.  Such tax credits are motivated 
by the fact that a large share of the uninsured, roughly one-quarter, are offered health insurance 
by their employers but do not take up that offer.  The goal of employee tax credits are to 




A final alternative for tax policy is to expand the existing subsidy to employers for their 
spending on health insurance through employer tax credits.  For example, in his campaign for the 
2004 Democratic Presidential nomination, Congressman Richard Gephardt proposed a 60% 
credit for the cost of health insurance for all firms, in addition to their existing tax exclusion.  
There have also been a large number of congressional proposals for targeted employer credits to 
small and/or low wage firms. 
 
Efficiency Implications of Tax Policies 
Given the budgetary limitations on any public approach to expand health insurance 
coverage, a key concept that drives reform is the efficiency of the policy.  There are several 
different means of defining efficiency, which I will review below, but the basic concept is the 
extent to which new public spending is directed to those who would otherwise be uninsured, as 
opposed to “buying out the base” of existing insured individuals.  The issue that is central to all 
of these definitions is targeting.  If individuals were indelibly labeled as “insured” or 
“uninsured”, then the government could easily target new tax subsidies to those labeled 
uninsured, with no spending on those labeled insured.  In fact, this is not the case: insurance 
status is a choice of the individual, and can respond to government policy in a way which causes 
the policy to have lower efficiency. 
It is useful to think about the uninsured as tuna and those who already have insurance as 
dolphins. The goal of environmentally conscious fishermen is to catch as many tuna as possible 




happens since tuna and dolphins swim together in the ocean).  If the uninsured tunas were 
swimming in a separate ocean than the insured dolphins, the problem would be minimized.  And 
if the uninsured tunas greatly outnumbered the insured dolphins, then there would also be a 
minimal dolphin catch.  But, in reality, the 45 million uninsured tunas mostly swim in a part of 
the ocean where there are 180 million insured dolphins, making it difficult if not impossible for 
policymakers to design insurance nets to capture the tuna without pulling in the much more 
numerous dolphins. 
There are three sources of inefficiency with tax credits.  The first is spending on those 
who already have coverage through the subsidized form of insurance.  The group that will benefit 
most clearly from subsidies for non-group insurance, for example, is those already holding non-
group insurance.  Yet the use of subsidies by this group does nothing to reduce the number of the 
uninsured. 
The second is the crowd-out of other forms of insurance through subsidizing a particular 
form of insurance.  For example, when the government subsidizes non-group insurance, it can 
lead those with group insurance to move to the non-group market, either by their decision 
(switching out of employer-provided insurance) or by their employer’s decision (dropping the 
offering of insurance at the firm).  This crowd-out may or may not lead to inefficiency in 
government spending, however.  For example, when individuals lead employer-provided 
insurance for non-group insurance, they increase spending on new non-group subsidies, but 
decrease spending on the existing exclusion of employer-provided insurance purchases.  On net, 




The third source of inefficiency is the possible reduction in coverage for those who are 
insured before the policy is put into place.  For example, suppose that a firm has a workforce that 
is predominantly, but not universally, eligible for a non-group credit.  This firm might decide to 
stop offering health insurance, since the majority of its employees can use the credit instead.  The 
minority of employees that cannot use the credit is then out of luck, however, since they have lost 
their employer insurance with no subsidized alternative, and these individuals may become 
uninsured.  This rise in uninsurance offsets the reductions in the ranks of the existing uninsured, 
reducing the efficiency of the program by raising spending per newly insured person. 
Based on this discussion, there are several different means of measuring efficiency.  The 
traditional measure is the “buck for the bang”: dollars of public spending per person newly 
insured.  Another measure of interest is the extent of crowdout: the reduction in employer-
provided insurance when other forms of insurance are subsidized (or when the existing subsidies 
to employer-provided insurance are reduced).  A third measure of interest is the (gross) rise in the 
uninsured, due for example to firm dropping.  A fourth measure is the share of beneficiaries of 
any intervention that were previously uninsured, as opposed to receiving subsidies to remain 
insured. 
A final measure incorporates the type of uninsured who are impacted by reform.  Simply 
counting the dollars per newly insured is not satisfactory when different reforms may appeal to 
very different populations.  For example, a reform which significantly increases insurance 
coverage among children will have much lower costs than one which has the bulk of its impacts 




reform is essentially extending more valuable insurance coverage than is the former.  So a better 
measure of efficiency is the spending per dollar of insurance value provided, which incorporates 
both the numerical increases in coverage and the cost of the individuals provided coverage. 
 
  Part II: Micro-Simulation Modeling 
The analysis in this paper relies on micro-simulation modeling using a model I have 
developed over the past five years (as first described in Gruber and Levitt, 2000).  This micro-




The data base for this analysis is the February and March, 2001 Current Population 
Survey (CPS).  The March survey contains data on family demographic characteristics, income, 
and health insurance coverage, while the February survey adds information on employer 
insurance offering.  Importantly, the March survey also contains data on taxable income and 
marginal tax rates. 
To these data are matched to information on health insurance premiums and health costs. 
 Data on the premiums for employer insurance, and the distribution of premiums between 
employers and employees, comes from the annual Kaiser/HRET national survey of employers.  
These data are matched on by state (or state group for small states), and are assumed to fall with 




on analyses from the Community Tracking Survey and the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey 
(MEPS), and data on premiums collected by the Commonwealth Fund, the Health Insurance 
Association of America, and e-health insurance.com.  This premium is then adjusted by age, sex 
and health status using factors provided by an actuarial consulting firm.   
Finally, data on underlying medical expenditures comes from the MEPS.  Total medical 
expenditures of those with employer-provided health insurance are estimated as a function of 
age, sex and health status.  These estimates are then reduced by 15% to account for 
administrative costs of private health insurance.  The resulting costs are assigned both to those on 
public insurance, and as a measure of the underlying value of insurance provision.  All cost data 
in the model has been updated to $2004. 
 
Modeling Individual Behavior 
These data are used to develop a micro-simulation model that computes the effects of 
health insurance policies on the distribution of health care spending and private and public sector 
health care costs.  This model takes as inputs both the data sources described above and the 
detailed parameterization of reform options.  The model first turns these policy rules into a set of 
insurance price changes; for example, if the policy intervention is a tax credit for non-group 
insurance, then the model computes the implied percentage change in the price of nongroup 
insurance for each individual in the model.  These prices changes are then run through a detailed 
set of behavioral assumptions about how changes in the absolute and relative price of various 




The key concept behind this modeling is that the impact of tax reforms on the price of 
insurance continuously determines behaviors such as insurance take-up by the uninsured and 
insurance offering by employers.  The model assiduously avoids “knife-edge” type behavior, 
where some critical level is necessary before individuals respond, and beyond which responses 
are very large.  Instead, behavior is modeled as a continuous function of how policy changes (net 
of tax) insurance prices. 
In doing this type of analysis, a number of assumptions must be made about how 
individuals will respond to tax subsidies, through their effect on the price of insurance.   These 
assumptions have been developed based on the available empirical evidence, as reviewed in 
detail in Gruber (2002).  Some of the key assumptions are:
1 
 
Take-up of subsidized non-group insurance among the uninsured: I calculate take-up of such 
subsidies by the uninsured by applying both a price elasticity and a correction for the burden of 
premiums relative to income.  For the base price elasticity, I use -0.625.  I then augment this with 
a correction factor of the form: (1- (X/income))
2, where X is the post-subsidy non-group 
premium for one-half of the population, and X is the pre-subsidy non-group premium for one-
half of the population.  This term accounts for two factors which are likely to lead to take-up that 
falls with income.  The first the fact that as income falls, individuals are less likely to take up 
subsidies which are less than 100%, as disposable income is needed for other expenditures that 
                                                 
1There is obviously variation in the possible assumptions that could be made here.  See 
Remler et al. (2002) for a broad review of the assumptions made in micro-simulation models 




may be perceived as more urgent (such as food and housing).  The second is liquidity constraints: 
insurance expenditures are made throughout the year, but any credits or deductions are only 
received the next April.  This is a much larger problem for lower income individuals who have 
both little savings and potentially poor access to credit markets.  I assume that, due to 
administrative efforts to address this “advancability” problem, it only arises for one-half of the 
sample.
2  The quadratic form of the expression captures the fact that both of these effects are 
likely to operate very strongly towards the bottom of the income distribution.  On average, the 
takeup elasticity for the uninsured is -0.45 to -0.5.
3 
 
Switching from group to non-group policies: I assume that individuals compare their out of 
pocket costs of group insurance with the subsidized costs of non-group insurance in making their 
switching decisions.  In particular, switching from group to non-group is a function of the post-
subsidy non-group premium minus the post-subsidy employee cost of health insurance, divided 
by the full cost of group insurance (the value of the insurance), with an elasticity of -0.33. 
 
Price sensitivity of employee take-up of employer-provided insurance.  One of the clearest 
                                                 
2This assumption may be generous, given that the government’s only existing experience 
with advancability, advance claiming of the Earned Income Tax Credit, has only a 1% take-up 
rate. 
3At the average income correction factor in our sample of uninsured, this produces an 
elasticity of -0.5.  This estimate is lower than that of Gruber and Poterba (1994), who suggest 
elasticities of -1 or greater (in absolute value).   The upper bound elasticity is similar to recent 
estimates by Royalty (2000).  The average elasticity is somewhat higher than the range of -0.33 




lessons from health economics over the past decade is that the decision of employees to take-up 
insurance provided by their employers is not very sensitive to price.
4  As a result, for those with 
insurance whose employers raise contributions, I compute the ratio of changes in employee 
contributions to insurance relative to the full price of employer-provided insurance, and assume 
that there is only a -0.1 elasticity of take-up of employer-provided insurance with respect to this 
ratio.  For those without insurance whose employers lower contributions, I compute the 
percentage change in employee contributions, and assume an elasticity of -0.067 for changes of 
less than 75%, and an elasticity that rises to -0.75 for changes between 75 and 100%. 
                                                 
4See Gruber and Washington (forthcoming) for a review of the literature on this point and 
further evidence. 
 
Modeling Firm Behavior 
A key aspect of modeling health insurance policy is appropriately reflecting the decisions 
of firms, since 90% of private health insurance is provided by employers.  Economists tend to 
model firm decision-making as reflecting the aggregation of worker preferences within the firm.  
The exact aggregation function is unclear, as reviewed in Gruber (2002); in my model I assume 
that the mean incentives for the firm (e.g. the average subsidy rate for non-group insurance) is 




The fundamental problem faced by individual-based micro-simulation models is that data 
on individuals does not reflect the nature of their co-workers, so that it is impossible to exactly 
compute concepts such as the average non-group subsidy in a worker’s firm.  I address this 
problem by building “synthetic firms” in the CPS, assigning each CPS worker a set of co-
workers selected to represent the likely true set of co-workers in that firm.  The core of this 
computation is data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics that show, for workers of any given 
earnings level, the earnings distribution of their co-workers, separately by firm size, region of the 
country, and health insurance offering status.  Using these data, I randomly select 99 individuals 
in the same firm size/region/health insurance offering cell as a given CPS worker in order to 
statistically replicate the earnings distribution for that worker’s earnings level.  These 99 workers 
then become the co-workers in a worker’s synthetic firm. 
These synthetic firms then face three decisions about insurance: offering (whether to offer 
if now not offering, or whether to drop if now offering); the division of costs between employer 
and employees; and the level of insurance spending.  I model each of these decisions as subject to 
“pressures” from government interventions.  In particular: 
·  Subsidies to outside insurance options (non-group insurance or public insurance) exert 
pressures on firm’s offering insurance to drop that insurance and to raise employee 
contributions. 
·  Subsidies to employer spending on insurance cause firms that don’t now offer insurance 
to be more likely to offer, causes firms will pick up a larger share of the cost of insurance, 




·  Subsidies to employee spending on insurance also raise the odds that firms offer 
insurance, and raise employer spending on insurance, but they lower employer 
contributions to insurance. 
Modeling the firm reactions to these pressures involves once again making a number of 
assumptions about the behavior of these synthetic firms.  Some of the key assumptions are: 
 
Firm Offering/Dropping: I key firm offering/dropping responses to the price elasticities of 
insurance demand for firms estimated in Gruber and Lettau (2004): -0.69 for firms with fewer 
than 100 employees; -0.2 for firms with 100-999 employees; and -0.1 for firms with more than 
1000 employees.  For firm offering in response to employer subsidies, I compute the ratio of 
subsidies to existing employer spending, and apply these elasticities; for firm offering in response 
to employee subsidies, I reduce this by 0.7, to account for the fact that only about 70% of 
employees take up insurance.  For firm dropping in response to a non-group subsidy, I compare 
the extent of the non-group subsidy to the existing tax subsidy to employer insurance: when the 
non-group subsidy is below the existing group tax subsidy, I apply only a fraction of the Gruber-
Lettau elasticities, rising from 50% to 100% to the point where non-group subsidies and existing 
tax subsidies are equal; from that point on, I simply apply the Gruber-Lettau elasticity. 
 
Employee Contributions: When the government subsidizes spending on employer-provided 
insurance, this will affect the distribution of spending across employer and employee.  If the 





5  Likewise, if the subsidy goes to the employee, I assume that 
employers raise employee contributions to offset 70 cents of each dollar of (average across the 
firm) subsidies to employees.  When there is a subsidy to non-group insurance, I assume that the 
firm raises employee contributions by 15% of the subsidy rate, in order to encourage non-group 
insurance take-up. 
 
Employer Spending: If the government offers an open-ended percentage credit, I assume an 
elasticity of spending with respect to the credit amount of 50%, but if there is a flat dollar credit, 
I assume that only 20 cents of each dollar goes to higher spending.  For employee credits, 
spending reacts in the same way, but scaled down by 0.7. 
                                                 
5Gruber and McKnight (2003) estimate an elasticity of employee contributions with 
respect to the tax price of employer-provided insurance of 0.3. 
Finally, a key assumption for this type of modeling is the assumption on the wage 
incidence of changes in employer-insurance spending.  Gruber (2001) reviews the literature on 
incidence, and concludes that there is strong evidence for full shifting to wages of firm-wide 
changes in insurance costs, with some evidence of shifting to sub-groups within the workplace as 
well.  I make a mixed incidence assumption for this model.  Any firm-wide reaction, such as 




individual’s decision, such as switching from group to non-group insurance, is not reflected in 
that individual’s wages; rather, the savings to the firm (or the cost to the firm) is passed along on 
average to all workers in the firm. 
 
An Example: Expanding Public Health Insurance 
It is difficult to interpret the results for tax policy that come from this model without 
some baseline, so in this section I illustrate the results from this model for two examples of 
expansions in our existing safety net of public insurance programs.  The first example is the 
introduction of free public health insurance for all persons in the U.S. with income below 100% 
of the poverty line; in this range, children and many parents are already eligible for public 
insurance, but single adults and most parents are not.   The second is the introduction of public 
health insurance for all persons in the U.S. with income below 225% of the poverty line; once 
again, most children in the U.S. are eligible for much of this range, but most adults are not. 
The effects of these three policies on health insurance coverage, costs, and the income 
distribution are summarized in Table 1, which presents some key outputs from these model runs. 
 The first row shows the number of uninsured persons who take-up the medicaid expansions, 
which is 3.13 million persons for the 100% expansion, and 8.75 million persons for the 225% 
expansion.  The next row shows a first measure of policy targeting: the percentage of individuals 
taking up public insurance who were formerly uninsured.  For the 100% expansion, 85% of those 
taking up public insurance were formerly uninsured, and only 15% were leaving other forms of 




insurance were formerly uninsured.  As we will see below, these are incredibly well-targeted 
policies. 
The next row shows rise in uninsured that occurs through one of two channels: 
individuals who lose insurance when their firms stop offering, or individuals who drop employer-
provided insurance when contributions rise in response to the public insurance expansion (the 
majority of this total is accounted for by the former group).  This number is very modest for the 
100% expansion, 0.07 million, but it is more sizeable for the 225% expansion, 0.82 million.  The 
next row shows the net change in uninsured, approximately 3 and 8 million, respectively. 
The remaining rows in the first panel show the change in the size of other insurance 
groups from this policy.  There is a small reduction in the number of employer insured from the 
expansion to 100%, as those with employer insurance switch to public insurance (since it is free) 
and some employers stop offering employer insurance.  There is also a small migration from non-
group insurance to public insurance.  When eligibility is expanded to 225% of poverty, there is a 
much larger reduction in the number of employer insured (almost 4 million) and non-group 
insured (over 1 million). 
The total cost of these policies is shown in the next panel.  The expansion to 100% of 
poverty costs almost $11.4 billion per year, while the expansion to 225% costs almost $29 
billion.  Both policies have a comparable cost per person newly insured of roughly $3700.  
The next panel of the table focuses on the targeting of the policy, in terms of which types 
of formerly uninsured individuals are helped by this intervention.  For these expansions, the 




fair or poor health, and 18-20% are in excellent health.  For comparison, among all uninsured 
persons, the average age is 30 years old, 9% are in fair/poor health, and 29% are in excellent 
health.  Thus, the set of individuals getting covered by these expansions are in much worse 
health, and therefore more costly to insure, than are the set of uninsured individuals not affected 
by the policy.   
This point is summarized by the next row in the table, which shows the average cost 
associated with insuring the uninsured who gain coverage through these initiatives.  For this 
calculation, I have imputed to each person in the data the cost of insuring them through public 
insurance (which is roughly 15% below the cost of private insurance), as a measure of the “true” 
insurance cost.  For all uninsured persons, this average cost is $2100; for those gaining insurance 
through these expansions, the cost is 25-50% higher, at $2700-$3200. 
Finally, the last row shows government spending per dollar of insurance value provided, 
which is the ratio of government spending to the sum of the insurance value provided to the 
uninsured.  This figure is $1.17 for the expansion to 100% of poverty, indicating that for each 
dollar of insurance the government is providing, it is spending $1.17.  Thus, roughly speaking, 
the deadweight loss of this approach to providing insurance, relative to an ideal which gave 
insurance only to those who were otherwise uninsured, is 17 cents.  This small deadweight loss 
arises from the small amount of substitution from other forms of insurance into public insurance 
that accompanies the reduction in the uninsured.  For the larger expansion, the inefficiency rises 





  Part III: Alternative Expansions of Tax Subsidies 
In this section, I consider the implications of alternative types of expansions of the tax 
code to increase insurance coverage.  In order to make our results comparable to the runs shown 
earlier for public insurance, I have chosen tax policy parameters designed to meet two goals: to 
reduce the number of uninsured by 3 million persons, and to reduce the number of uninsured by 8 
million persons.  The cost per person covered from these policies typically falls as the number of 
persons covered rises, so it is important to compare these policies on a comparable basis. 
One overall note of importance: for all of the analysis considered here, I assume that any 
tax policies are fully refundable.  Roughly half of the uninsured do not pay taxes, so any non-
refundable tax policy will have very limited impact.   
 
Non-group Credits 
I begin with non-group tax credits of a simple form.  Individuals and families are eligible 
for a credit of one size for single coverage, and another size for family coverage.  This eligibility 
is restricted on income in one of two ways.  First, I consider a “tightly targeted” non-group credit, 
which is fully available to single persons with income below $15,000, or families with income 
below $30,000, and which phases out as income rises, with eligibility ending at $30,000 for 
singles and $60,000 for families.  Second, I consider a “loosely targeted” non-group credit, which 
is fully available to single persons with income below $25,000, or families with income below 
$50,000, and which phases out as income rises, with eligibility ending at $50,000 for singles and 




hit the targets of 3 million and 8 million reduction in the uninsured. 
The results of this analysis are shown in Table 2.  Several differences from Table 1 are 
immediately apparent.  First, there is a much larger gross increase in the uninsured offsetting the 
gross reduction in meeting our targets of 3 and 8 million.  For example, to hit the target of an 8 
million person reduction with tight targeting requires take-up by 12.4 million persons, since there 
is a 4.4 million person rise in the uninsured from firm dropping.  Second, there are very large 
reductions in the number of employer insured, due both to employee switching and firm 
dropping; roughly 20% of this reduction comes from switching, and the remaining 80% is due to 
firm dropping.  Moreover, a much smaller share of the recipients, between 34 and 45%, were 
previously uninsured; the majority are using this subsidy while retaining insurance coverage. 
This may seem like a lot of firm dropping in response to (in particular in the first column) 
fairly small non-group credits, but it is important to remember that this reduction in employer 
insured is off of a very large base of over 160 million employer-insured.  The 5.29 million 
reduction in employer-insured in the first column, for example, represents just over 3% of the 
employer-insured in the U.S.  Even with the enormous non-group credit shown in the second 
column, $4750 for singles and $11,875 for families, only 8.2% of those with employer-provided 
insurance drop that insurance.  This is partly because the credits are targeted to only a subset of 
employees, so that on average the pressure on employers to stop offering insurance (due to the 
erosion of the employer tax advantage) is small.  When the credit is more loosely targeted, in the 
final two columns, the reduction in the employer-insured is much larger, rising to almost 16% of 




Third, this approach is by and large more expensive than public expansions.  For the 3 
million target, with the tightly targeted credit, the cost is very similar to the public expansion.  
The other approaches, however, are much more expensive, both overall and (by definition) per 
person newly insured.  Indeed, a loosely targeted credit designed to cover 8 million persons costs 
over $85 billion per year, or more than $10,000 per person newly insured.  
Another striking difference between public expansions and non-group credits is the 
targeting of the spending.  In contrast to public expansions, the set of uninsured who gain 
coverage through non-group credits are much healthier than the average uninsured person, with 
an average age of 25-28 years, and only 2-4% in fair or poor health.  The average cost of insuring 
the newly insured is only $1500-$1800 per year. 
The reason for these low costs is that these types of partial subsidies to non-group 
insurance are much more attractive to the healthy individuals for whom the lower cost of non-
group insurance makes these a larger percentage subsidy.  As a result, the value of insurance 
provided by these policies is much less than for a public expansion.  Indeed, as the last row 
shows, it takes more than $3 to almost $10 of government spending to provide just $1 of 
insurance coverage through these policies.  Thus, by this measure, non-group tax credits are 
much less efficient than public insurance expansions. 
Another lesson is that the efficiency of non-group credits is much higher if they are 
tightly, rather than loosely, targeted.  This is because, given the low incomes of the uninsured, 
more tightly targeted credits spend a higher share of their costs on those who would otherwise be 








Another tax policy alternative which has received substantial attention is tax credits to 
offset the costs to employees of purchasing their employer-provided health insurance.  The 
motivation for these credits is the “low hanging fruit” of the large number of uninsured who are 
already offered employer-provided health insurance.  Since these individuals are in an arena 
where it is easy to obtain health insurance, the reasoning goes, and since employers already pay 
the majority of insurance costs, it should be relatively cheap to subsidize these uninsured to take-
up insurance. 
There are three problems with this argument, however.  First, if employee contributions 
become tax-subsidized by the government, then employers have an incentive to shift the costs of 
insurance to employees - or at least they no longer have a disincentive to do so.  As noted earlier, 
Gruber and McKnight (2003) find a substantial negative response of employee contributions to 
the tax subsidy to employer-provided insurance; presumably, tax subsidies to employee 
contributions would have the opposite effect.  Second, this is a very poorly targeted policy: the 
vast majority of those offered employer-provided health insurance take-up that insurance.  
Indeed, of those offered employer-provided insurance, only about 7% are uninsured; even among 
the population below the poverty line, 75% of those offered insurance are insured.  Finally, as 




insurance, if offered, is not price sensitive. 
Table 3 shows the results of running several employee tax credit policies through my 
microsimulation model.  Once again, this Table considers tightly and loosely targeted credits, 
with the same income cutoffs as for non-group insurance, targeted to hit 3 million and 8 million 
person reductions in the uninsured.  Along some dimensions, employee tax credits look more 
attractive than non-group credits. There is only a small rise in the uninsured that offsets the take-
up by the previously insured; this small increase comes from individuals leaving their employer-
provided insurance because the firm has raised contributions, but they are not one of the 
subsidized employees.  There is also a rise, rather than a fall, in employer-provided insurance.  
Finally, as the last panel shows, these policies are somewhat better targeted to the uninsured in 
poor health than are non-group credits, although the targeting is still much less than with public 
insurance expansions. 
On one key dimension, however, employee credits perform much worse: cost.  To cover 3 
million persons with a tightly targeted employee tax credit would cost over $35 billion per year, a 
cost of almost $12,000 per newly insured; if the targeting is looser, the cost rises to almost 
$20,000 per newly insured.  These higher costs arise because there is enormous expenditure on 
the vast majority of those offered who already have insurance, so that this is simply a subsidy to 
existing behavior: in most cases, fewer than 10% of those using this subsidy were previously 
uninsured.  As the final row of the Table shows, the government would spend between $6 and 
$13 per dollar of insurance provided if it pursued these types of policies.  




do non-group credits, since employer-insured individuals can take them without changing their 
existing insurance arrangements, they cost much more as well, since so much of the spending is 
an inframarginal subsidy to those who already have employer-provided insurance.  Indeed, only 
about 10% of the individuals taking advantage of this credit were previously uninsured. 
 
Employer Credits 
The final type of tax credit that I consider is credits to employers to offer insurance to 
their employees.  Once again, the parameters of these tax policies are chosen to hit targets of 3 
and 8 million person reductions in the uninsured, and once again there is a more tightly and a 
more loosely targeted version of these policies.  The more loosely targeted version is credits that 
are provided to all employers with fewer than 50 employees.  While typical of many proposals to 
subsidize employer-provided coverage, this type of subsidy structure has two disadvantages.  
First, the majority of firms with fewer than 50 employees still offer health insurance: non-
offering is concentrated in the very smallest firms, and those firms with the lowest-wage jobs.  
Second, such a “cliff” at 50 employees can provide disincentives for firms to grow beyond the 
critical 50 employee level. 
To address these concerns, a more tightly targeted version of these credits would make 
three changes: focus the subsidy dollars on the smallest firms; target subsidies to firms with the 
lowest wage employees; and phase out the subsidy as both firm size and wages rise, so as to 
avoid cliffs.  I do so in the more tightly targeted version of these employer credits, which phase 




with average earnings below $20,000, and phased out by firm average earnings of $30,000 (the 
average for small firms). 
The results for these more tightly and loosely targeted credits are presented in Table 4.  
The first noticeable implication of this approach is that the gross and net change in uninsured are 
identical: there is no crowdout with subsidies to employers.  Nevertheless, once again, a sizeable 
share of the dollars are delivered to those who already have health insurance; as the final row of 
the second panel shows, only between 9 and 35% of the subsidy recipients were formerly 
uninsured. 
In terms of total costs, and therefore costs per newly insured, the employer credit is very 
comparable to the non-group credit, and both remain much lower cost than the employee credit.  
One striking difference between the non-group credit and the employer credit, however, is that 
the employer credit covers a substantially higher cost population.  The average cost of the 
individuals gaining insurance is around $2000 for the employer credits, while the average cost is 
around $1500 for the non-group credits.  As a result, the government spending per dollar of 
insurance delivered is much lower for the employer credit than for the non-group credit. 
Table 4 once again highlights the important role of targeting.  The tight employer credit is 
fairly well targeted, at least relative to other tax policies, with 20-35% of the benefits going to the 
uninsured.  The loose employer credit, however, is very poorly targeted, since the majority of 
those in firms less than 50 employees already have health insurance, so that only 9-18% of the 






Table 5 provides a comparison of these various policy options, along the various 
measures of efficiency noted earlier: 
·  Induced increase in uninsured 
·  Change in employer-insured 
·  Dollars of spending per newly insured 
·  Percentage of beneficiaries formerly uninsured 
·  Average cost of those gaining insurance 
·  Dollars of spending per dollar of insurance provided 
The best measure of efficiency of government spending is the last.  It is immediately clear 
that expanding public insurance vastly outperforms tax policy along this dimension.  The most 
efficient tax policies along this dimension spend three times as much per dollar of insurance 
provided as do public expansions. 
Within tax policies, several lessons are apparent.  First, employer tax credits are the most 
efficient outcome, followed fairly closely by non-group credits, with employee tax credits clearly 
the worst.  Second, tightly targeted tax credits are much more efficient than loosely targeted tax 
credits, particularly for non-group insurance.  Third, efficiency almost universally declines as the 
size of the credit grows.  This is because (a) the uninsured are receiving more per person and (b) 
the credits become more attractive to the insured.  Thus, one cannot compare directly two 
policies that cover very different numbers of persons, since the policy covering more persons will 




Fourth, the efficiency of any policy is determined by several interactive factors: the size 
of the credit required to achieve the targeted reduction in uninsured; the share of benefits going to 
the uninsured; and the targeting of the benefits in terms of the health of the uninsured.  For 
example, compare the tight non-group and tight employer credits that cover 3 million persons.  In 
this case, the size of the credit is about 50% bigger for non-group credits, the share of recipients 
previously uninsured is almost twice as large for non-group credits, but the recipients are much 
healthier for non-group credits.  As a result, on net, employer credits are more efficient.  As 
another example, compare employee to employer credits.  These credits are similar in terms of 
the size of the credit, and the average health of the formerly uninsured recipients, but employer 
credits deliver a much larger share of benefits to the formerly uninsured. 
From this table, we can outline the weaknesses of each tax policy relative to each other, 
and the benchmark of a public insurance expansion.  Non-group credits have the highest share of 
recipients that are formerly uninsured; for loose credits, this share is much higher than either 
employee or employer credits.  Yet they are much less efficient than employer credits because the 
uninsured who take the credits are much healthier, and because a much larger credit is required to 
achieve the net reduction in the uninsured.  This larger credit is required, in turn, because the 
non-group credits cause the largest increase in the uninsured.  Thus, there is a vicious cycle with 
non-group credits; to cover many uninsured requires a larger credit, but the larger the credit, the 
more the erosion of the employer market, and the larger gross rise in the uninsured that must be 
offset by uninsured takeup of the non-group credit. 




coverage are of average health.  But these credits deliver a relatively small share of their benefits 
to the formerly uninsured, particularly if the credit is loosely targeted.  The least attractive option, 
from an efficiency perspective, is credits to employees.  This is because such a very small share 
of benefits accrue to the formerly uninsured, particularly for loosely targeted employee credits. 
 
  Part V: Conclusion 
It is clear from the analysis in this paper that, if the goal is to cover 3-8 million uninsured 
persons, expanding public insurance is a more efficient option than any tax policy that has been 
considered to date.  Despite this fact, tax policy will continue to be the avenue of choice for 
expanding health insurance coverage in the U.S. for politicians of many stripes.  Thus, it is 
critical to understand the strengths and weaknesses of alternative tax policy approaches. 
Several lessons for tax policy are clear from this analysis.  First, and probably most 
important, regardless of which tax policy option is considered, targeting is key: tightly targeted 
tax policies dramatically outperform loosely targeted policies in terms of efficiency.  This is an 
important conclusion to emphasize because targeting comes with political costs; it is much more 
politically expedient to allow a larger group of individuals benefit from a policy than to restrict 
those benefits to a smaller (low-income group).  Yet widening the income range of tax policies 
comes at great cost in terms of their effectiveness. 
Second, one cannot straightforwardly compare two policies that cover very different 
numbers of uninsured, as the efficiency of any tax policy falls as its scope increases.  Finally, 




share of individuals who are uninsured, but also which individuals are covered.  Providing 
coverage to very young and healthy individuals provides less insurance value per dollar of 
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